Security, Privacy, and the Effects of Ubiquitous Encryption

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(Speaking for myself, not the IETF)
Motivation for Increased Privacy Protections

- BULLRUN/EDGEHILL
- FOXACID
- PRISM
- RADON
- TRAILBLAZER
- TREASUREMAP
Privacy & Confidentiality on the Internet
Current IETF and IAB Guidance

• IETF Privacy Considerations for Internet protocols
  – https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6973/
  – Data protection
    ▪ Object level encryption
    ▪ Determining when data is not necessary
    ▪ Obscuring data or generalizing when possible
    ▪ Protections on sensitive data and indexes to that data
  – Push for encrypted traffic

• IAB Statement on Internet Confidentiality
Pervasive Monitoring Changed the Game

• Enable Opportunistic Encryption, making monitoring too costly to do broadly
• Force targeted attack on suspect traffic
New IETF Work Related to Pervasive Monitoring (PM)

• “Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack”
  – RFC7258/BCP188 published after major IETF LC debate –
    sets the basis for further actions
  – https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258.txt
  – BCP says to consider PM in IETF work
  – Existing-RFC privacy/PM review team formed

• Opportunistic security (OS)
  – Provides a way to get much easier deployment for some
    intermediate level of security
  – Fallback to unauthenticated encrypted sessions instead of
    plaintext
  – Updates to supported algorithms
  – Lower the barriers for key and certificate management
  – https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7435/
IETF Work related to PM and Opportunistic Security

- Using TLS in Applications (UTA WG)
  - Update existing RFCs on how to use TLS in applications and mandate implementation of non-PFS ciphersuites
  - BCPs for TLS and DTLS attacks and configurations
- TLS 1.3 (TLS WG)
  - TLS 1.3 being developed aiming for better handshake performance and encryption properties
  - And learning from our history of previous TLS problems
- HTTP/2.0 (HTTPBIS WG)
  - Major deployment model: HTTP over TLS, but not required yet
- TCP Increased Security (TCPInc)
  - Provide TLS functionality within TCP
  - Support Opportunistic security with a way to hook in authentication
- DNS Privacy
  - Reducing exposure of sensitive names found in DNS
- IPsec
  - NULL authentication support for Opportunistic Security approach
How are Operators and Security Professionals Impacted?

The Effects of Ubiquitous Encryption

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt/
Effects of Ubiquitous Encryption
Editors: Kathleen Moriarty & Al Morton

• Increased encryption impacts security & network operations
  – Shift how these functions are performed
  – New methods to monitor and protect data will evolve
  – In more drastic circumstances, ability to monitor may be eliminated

• Collection of current security and network management functions impacted by encryption
  – Draft does not attempt to solve these problems
  – It merely documents the current state to assist in the development of alternate options to achieve the intended purpose of the documented practices
What’s the Problem?
Encryption blocked to prevent impact on current operations

- Clear text has been used to inject ads, as well as monitor traffic for network and security purposes
- Operational capabilities are diminishing, some operators responded by stopping encryption negotiation
- Typically required exposure (media & regulators) to correct
Middlebox Monitoring
Traffic Interception and Pattern Matching

• Traffic Analysis Fingerprinting
  – Encrypted and clear text pattern matching
    ▪ Attack detection and monitoring
    ▪ Invade Privacy, web traffic

• Traffic Surveys
  – Observations over time
  – Inferences about observed traffic using maximal information available
  – Accuracy of patterns decline with encryption

• Deep Packet Inspection
  – Analysis of user flows and apps (for resource optimization)
  – Used with content distribution networks to improve efficiency
    ▪ Note: CDNs moving to end-to-end control of data now

• Data Compression Gateway
  – Minimize traffic required using resource-constrained services, e.g., Data Caps
Performance Management and Troubleshooting

Current methods for existing functions impacted by encryption

• Availability and Performance monitoring impacted by move to encryption
  – Inability to discern difference between network and host-related causes of unavailability

• Inaccuracy will increase and efficiency of repair activities will decrease

• Use of websockets will make application differentiation more difficult
Encryption in Hosted SP Environments
Drivers different for Increased Security Protections

• Management Access
  – SP access to manage infrastructure: encrypted or isolated
  – Customer management access encrypted

• Hosted Applications
  – Increasingly sensitive applications
  – Data leakage protection (DLP) now limited

• Access Control Management and monitoring shifting
  – Logs may be used as an alternative monitoring data source
  – Monitoring and filtering may be restricted to:
    ▪ 2-tuple  IP-level with source and destination IP addresses alone, or
    ▪ 5-tuple  IP and protocol-level with source IP address, destination IP address, protocol number, source port number, and destination port number.
Data Storage
Capabilities changed, but solution providers have adapted

• Host-level encryption
  – End-to-end, encrypted at application or prior to transition to hosted environment
  – Backup, external storage

• Disk encryption, Data at Rest
  – Requires transport encryption to protect data on the wire
  – May only be used to protect from physical theft of disk
  – Controller based encryption or Self Encrypting Drives

• Data replication between data centers
  – IPsec may limit ability to monitor
Incident Monitoring

Denial of Service

Fraud

Information

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Summary
Use of Encryption Encouraged to Protect Users Privacy

• Encryption increasing
  – in response to known threats and
  – move of sensitive application & data to hosted environments

• Protecting Users privacy at protocol level necessary

• Current techniques used by operators may no longer be possible in an encrypted Internet

• Devise new methods to accomplish goals
  – First document those goals and understanding objectives
  – Contribute to draft: “Effects of Ubiquitous Encryption”
Thank you!
Mission of the IETF

Make the Internet work better by producing high quality, relevant technical documents that influence the way people design, use, and manage the Internet.

RFC3935
Ethos of the IETF

• Open standards process
  – Everyone is invited to participate at all levels
  – Our primary venue is email
  – All working and published documents are freely available online

• One Internet
  – Open standards for a global Internet
  – Maximum interoperability and scalability
  – Avoid specialized protocols in different places
  – Contributions are judged on technical merits: rough consensus and running code, RFC7282